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Abstract 
This article employs a Tobit model to examine whether the market power of 
manufacturers and retailers influence trade promotion decisions in the US food sector. 
Greater retailer market power increases allocation of funds to off-invoice trade 
promotions. We find evidence that the balance of power favors food retailers. 
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MARKET POWER AND OFF-INVOICE TRADE PROMOTIONS IN 
THE US: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION  
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++++  
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Abstract. This article employs a Tobit model to examine whether the market 
power of manufacturers and retailers influence trade promotion decisions in the 
US food sector. Greater retailer market power increases allocation of funds to 
off-invoice trade promotions. We find evidence that the balance of power favors 
food retailers. 
 
Keywords: trade promotions, market power, industrial organization 
 
Introduction 
Trade promotions comprise a growing category of manufacturer incentives directed to 
channel members such as wholesale and retailers rather than to consumers. These 
promotions are generally designed to influence resellers’ sales and prices by providing 
various, sometimes complex, inducements. In recent years, manufacturers of consumer 
packaged goods (CPGs) have substantially increased the use of trade promotions (TPs) to 
distributors. Two decades ago, manufacturers allocated about 20 percent of their 
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marketing budgets to TPs; today this share reaches 70 percent. From 1997-2003, trade 
spending as a percent of CPG manufacturer gross sales grew from 13.5 percent to 17.4 
percent and now represents their second largest expense after the cost of goods 
(Cannondale Associates, 2003). Merli (1999) reports that total spending for trade 
promotions in the grocery industry alone rose from $8 billion in 1990 to more than $ 75 
billion by 1998, nearly a tenfold increase in eight years. Yet despite the magnitude of 
these promotional funds, gaps exist in the research literature regarding how the allocation 
of these funds are determined. Fundamental to explaining these gaps is the difficulty in 
gaining access to data from confidential supplier-retailer negotiations (Kasulis et al., 
1999, Drèze and Bell, 2003). This article addresses both of these issues. 
  Starting from one-time up-front payments in the 1970s (later called slotting 
allowances) and simple “cents-off” propositions in the early 1980s (Blattberg and Neslin, 
1990, Scheffman, 2002), TPs today have evolved into many complex contractual 
alternatives that influence channel behavior and performance and thus have generated a 
rich literature. Drèze and Bell (2003) summarize several of the most prominent reasons 
for the growth of trade promotion expenditures. Manufacturers often desire to counter the 
popularity of lower-price store brands, they may want to pass along a discount to a 
particularly price sensitive segment of shopper (eg. via a frequent shopper program), they 
may wish to enhance brand exposure with target consumers or, frequently, they simply 
may want to provide additional stimulus to move excess inventory or counteract 
competitors. Retailers favor trade spending since it builds store traffic, increases retail 
margins and because, generally, the majority of the costs (and risks) are borne by the Maratou, Gomez and Just  Market Power and Off-Invoice Trade Promotions in the US   
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brand manufacturer. Yet despite the general research conclusion that retailers are the 
chief beneficiaries of TPs, some research suggests that TPs can improve manufacturer 
performance as well. Aliwadi, Farris and Shames (1999) conclude that certain TP 
strategies that link manufacturer and retailer objectives are an “effective way for a 
manufacturer to influence the retailer’s selling activity and thereby coordinate the 
channel.”  
  Trade promotions, or deals, have developed into many forms—off-invoices, bill –
backs, free goods, co-op advertising, extended payment terms, and more (Blattberg and 
Neslin, 1990). Despite the proliferation of ever more creative forms of trade deals over 
the past 10 years—e.g., accrual funds, frequent shopper programs--at least until the mid-
1990s more than 90 percent of trade promotions involved “off-invoice allowances,” 
straightforward reductions off manufacturer list price (Blattberg and Neslin, 1990.) A 
number of classification schemes for trade promotions have been put forth (Kasulis et al., 
1999, Bell and Drèze, 2002), but this article divides TPs into two distinct groups:  
performance-based contracts and discount-based contracts. 
Performance-based contracts increase retail incentives to push the manufacturer’s 
product and are tied to a measure of retailer performance (e.g., units sold, displayed or 
price discounts in effect during a given period). Essentially, manufacturers agree to 
reimburse the retailer a specified amount for each unit sold. On the other hand, discount-
based promotions, primarily off-invoice allowances, tend to enhance the ability of 
retailers to make discretionary use of these funds, increasing the probability of 
opportunistic behavior from retailers. The mechanism for off-invoice allowances is Maratou, Gomez and Just  Market Power and Off-Invoice Trade Promotions in the US   
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simple: suppliers provide merchandise to retailers at a price discount, usually for a brief, 
specified period—two-three weeks is standard. Because of the greater number of degrees 
of freedom it affords them, retailers generally favor off-invoices over performance-based 
promotions while the opposite is true of manufacturers (Drèze and Bell, 2003). This is 
why market power of the retailers, the manufacturers and their relative power in the 
negotiation of trade promotions is important in determining the allocation of trade 
promotions. The objective of this article is to analyze the influence of retailers’ market 
power on the structure and function of the TPs manufacturers are willing to offer. In 
particular, we focus on the market power related factors that influence the share of off-
invoice allowances in the total promotional funds received by the retailer. By doing this, 
we hope to illuminate some of the reasons for the growing importance of TPs in general.  
With greater understanding of the economic forces driving the effectiveness of 
TPs, negotiation between retailers and manufacturers will be better informed, resulting in 
TPs that are consistent with the respective market positions in the channel. More 
informed negotiation, should lead to greater efficiency of TP programs and better 
decisions regarding cost, profit and gross margins of retailers and manufacturers. 
Our article is organized as follows: first we review the literature on the determinants of 
allocation of trade promotions. Next we explain our model and data. Finally, we present 
our findings and conclude with the implications of our work.   
 Maratou, Gomez and Just  Market Power and Off-Invoice Trade Promotions in the US   
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Literature review 
Three themes can be identified in prior trade promotion studies. First, researchers have 
examined the rapid growth of trade promotions and determine their returns on investment. 
Various studies (c.f., Ailawadi, Farris and Shames, 1999, Tyagi, 1999, Drèze and Bell, 
2003) examine the retail response to TPs. In general, these studies indicate that current 
trade promotional practices cannot be shown to be efficient for the channel but, despite 
the suggestions regarding improved TP design, historical trade practices persist. A second 
stream of research focuses on the extent to which retailers actually pass on trade 
promotions to consumers in the form of lower prices rather than retain some portion of 
the promotional funds to contribute to other retailer expenses or profits (Tyagi, 1999, 
Kumar, Rajiv and Jeuland, 2001, Besanko, Dube and Gupta, 2004). The main 
conclusions of these studies come in the form of additional hypotheses and call for 
further efforts to conduct empirical tests on pass through. 
Third, a strain of research primarily from industrial organization economics, 
examines the causes and consequences of trade promotions as a function of the relative 
retail-supplier power balance in the distribution channel (see, for example, Sullivan, 2002, 
Scheffman, 2002; Hamilton, 2003). Whereas the first two themes relate primarily to 
perspectives for managers, the latter market power theme has focused more on issues 
arising from industry structure and behavior issues and system performance, and public 
policy consequences. Much of this literature finds demand distortions that result from 
TPs and non-optimal allocation of resources leading to inefficiency. Kasulis et al. (1999) 
argue that different trade promotions can produce dissimilar channel performance and Maratou, Gomez and Just  Market Power and Off-Invoice Trade Promotions in the US   
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consumer impacts as a result of the market power of channel participants. Hamilton 
(2003), however, concludes that certain promotion funds, particularly so-called slotting 
allowances, may actually be motivated by suppliers, not retailers. He notes that these 
allowances may be employed by suppliers to better coordinate channel activity, ending in 
greater supplier sales and improvements in consumer welfare. 
Studies on market power in trade promotions develop rigorous models based on 
microeconomic theory, yet empirical studies on the subject are scarce (Kasulis et al., 
1999). In particular, extant literature does not model the influence of balance of market 
power between manufacturers and retailers on the allocation of dollars across alternative 
TP activities. Prior research did not take into account the effect of TP policies of 
manufacturers and retailers on the aforementioned allocation. Our article addresses these 
issues. We follow Kasulis et al. (1999), who develop a theory of managing TPs in the 
context of market power. They argue that horizontal market power of retailers (i.e., the 
market power within the retail industry) should have a large impact on the effectiveness, 
and therefore structure of TPs. A retailer with greater market power will exert greater 
control over its sale promotions, and provide greater exposure for the promoted brands. 
In this article, we test the arguments posited by Kasulis et al. (1999). We focus on off-
invoice TPs, which are more beneficial to the retailers, as they do not require attitudinal 
commitment (i.e. increased sales to the end consumer). It is of great importance for 
manufacturers to be able to monitor off-invoice TPs, and for retailers to determine the 
appropriate amount of spending by manufacturer.  
 Maratou, Gomez and Just  Market Power and Off-Invoice Trade Promotions in the US   
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Model and data 
Economic model 
We examine the percent of trade promotions allocated to off-invoice allowances as a 
function of the horizontal (over all ‘peers’) market power of the manufacturer, the 
horizontal market power of the retailer and the relative power between the specific 
negotiating dyad of manufacturer and retailer (i.e. dyad M-R). Following Kasulis et al. 
(1999), we posit that the allocation of TP funds is a direct function of the market power 
of the retailer and the manufacturer. We focus exclusively on off-invoice TPs, estimating 
the reduced form equation 
 
(1)   TP_offinvoice = f(Market_Power_R, Market_Power_M, Relative_Power(R / M))  
 
where TP_offinvoice is the percent of promotional funds allocated to off-invoices, 
Market_Power_R is the horizontal market power of the retailer, Market_Power_M is the 
horizontal market power of the manufacturer, and Relative_Power is a measure of the 
specific balance of power in the dyad (figure 1). 
[Figure 1 About Here] 
Market power of retailer is expected to have a positive relationship with the 
percent of funds allocated to off-invoice TPs. This is because theory tells us as that when 
the retailer has increased market power it will try to increase allocation to off-invoice TPs 
as this is a short-term commitment and very beneficial for the retailers (Kasulis et al., 
1999). This concept of retailer market power includes the outlet distinctiveness of the Maratou, Gomez and Just  Market Power and Off-Invoice Trade Promotions in the US   
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retailer (e.g. commercial type), its competitive position, the product category importance 
and the consumer loyalty. Competitive position of retailer can be measured with 
constructs such as value-added capabilities (e.g. advertising support, loyalty card, 
merchandising expertise, cost-saving programs, Every day low prices –EDLP), financial 
data (e.g. market share, sales growth, etc.), share of private labels that the retailer carries, 
and the product category.  
Market power of manufacturer should have a negative relationship with the share 
of off-invoices in total TP expenditures, because theory tells us that when the 
manufacturer has increased market power it will avoid off-invoice TPs. This happens 
because off invoices allow forward buying by retailers (carrying excess inventory during 
discount period), diverting (the retailer resells the discounted product to other retailers in 
higher price) and inventory management cost (resulting from the excess inventory carried 
by the retailer) (Drèze and Bell, 2003). Market power of the manufacturer refers to 
horizontal power, across all other manufacturers. This concept of the manufacturer’s 
market power includes the brand distinctiveness (e.g. price difference compared to other 
brands), life cycle of manufacturer’s brand, product category importance and consumer 
loyalty. The competitive position of manufacturer can be measured in terms of value-
added capabilities (e.g. advertising support, merchandising expertise, cost-saving 
programs) and in financial data (e.g. market share, sales growth, etc.). 
The relative power (R/M), gives the balance of power in the specific dyad of the 
manufacturer and the retailer that is negotiating for a trade promotion contractual 
arrangement. It includes the perception of each company for the other, and it could be Maratou, Gomez and Just  Market Power and Off-Invoice Trade Promotions in the US   
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measured through brand’s relative importance, the ability to influence and some policy 
established between the dyad (Kasulis et al., 1999).  
 
Data  
We employ a unique data set collected from 43 supermarket companies and 12 food 
manufacturers operating in the US and representing about $250 billion of annual sales, 
about 50 percent of the total US supermarket sales. These data were obtained by the Food 
Industry Management Program (FIMP) at Cornell University in 2003, Trade Promotion 
Study. Each company provided data related to its trade promotions for the leading brand, 
the second brand, and a growing brand (i.e. a brand that has gained substantial market in 
recent years/months), for two product categories randomly selected from a total of six 
(ready-to-eat cereal, frozen dinners/entrees, coffee, laundry detergent, pet food, and 
chocolate bars).  
Our data set contains information on the amount of trade promotion dollars 
received from suppliers, the percent allocation of these funds across trade promotion 
activities (off-invoices versus pay-for-performance contracts), the policies in place 
regarding the negotiation of TPs, and the perceived impacts of each type of TP. The 
managers responded on the actual allocation of TP spending and not on their willingness 
to accept or change them. Additionally, we collected relevant variables from secondary 
sources concerning manufacturers and supermarket companies in our sample. The survey 
employs brand as the unit of observation. Maratou, Gomez and Just  Market Power and Off-Invoice Trade Promotions in the US   
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The survey was not specifically designed for the current analysis, and there is the 
possibility of selection bias in our data, as we have a sample of convenience. However, it 
is the first time that trade promotion data is collected from food retailers and it is 
therefore the best available. Further, our data represent close to 50% of retail sales in the 
CPG industry. Thus we expect this data to be representative of at least the most important 
TP relationships considered in our study. Table 1 contains a list of variables used in our 
analysis and accompanying descriptions. 
[Table 1 About Here] 
We capture horizontal market power of manufacturer (Market_Power_M) 
employing share of brand in the national market (brand distinctiveness) and average 
percent sales growth in the last three years (competitive position). We measure horizontal 
market power of retailers using customer loyalty, retailer sales, type of retailer (retailer 
and retailer/wholesaler or hybrid) and share of private label. We measure relative power 
using brand’s relative power (leading, second or growing brand), ability of manufacturer 
and retailer to influence the negotiation of TP contracts, as well as the existence of formal 
policies for the negotiations of trade promotions. 
Data on consumer loyalty for the retailer are from published Consumer Reports 
(2003) that measure the customer satisfaction of 25,000 readers of reports. Scores are on 
as scale of 0 to 100% and indicate general satisfaction with the shopping experience. 
Relative power is estimated through the answers to the empirical survey and includes 
whether the retailer initiates and/or selects the TP type and whether the two parties have 
formal policies for the negotiation of trade promotions. Regarding TP policies, our data Maratou, Gomez and Just  Market Power and Off-Invoice Trade Promotions in the US   
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set includes variables measuring whether manufacturer has TP policies favoring pay-for-
performance promotions, whether retailer has TP policies favoring off-invoice contracts 
and whether the manufacturer-retailer dyad has TP policies favoring co-marketing 
contracts. Including company policies is a key contribution of our article, because they 
can serve as a framework of measuring relative power and can have policy implications.  
We measure competitive position of the retailer using data on the retailer market 
share in major metropolitan areas of trading region and on the retailer average sales 
growth in the last 3 years. For the category importance for the retailer we use retailer 
sales for the product category. For a measure of brand distinctiveness of the 
manufacturer we employ data on price difference of the brand.
1 We measure competitive 
position of the manufacturer using annual sales and share of total manufacturer sales in 
the national market. Product category importance of the manufacturer is measured using 
share of the brand in the national market of the product category. We employ self-
assessment of the impact (high-medium-low) of the off-invoice TP type on product 
category sales, on product category margins and on product category administration 
efforts. As a proxy for the consumer loyalty of the manufacturer we use the 
manufacturer’s brand share in the product category’s national market. While this is not a 
perfect measure of consumer loyalty, it should be highly correlated with consumer 
attachment to a particular manufacturer or group of brands. 
Our sample consists of two commercial types of retailers, namely those that are 
only retailers (‘Pure’) and these that have integrated wholesaling activities as well as Maratou, Gomez and Just  Market Power and Off-Invoice Trade Promotions in the US   
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retailing (‘Hybrids’). Our sample consists of 185 observations from the empirical survey 
and the relevant descriptive statistics are shown in table 2.  
[Table 2 About Here] 
We also created a subset including only the ‘Pure’ retailers, as we are interested in 
their behavior and the comparative effect of consumer loyalty relative to the total sample. 
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics for this sub-sample, which contains 136 
observations.  
[Table 3 About Here] 
Empirical model 
We estimate the relationships described in the previous section using a simple linear 
representation of the function in (1). We have a censored sample as our dependent 
variable, percent of off-invoice dollars from the total TP expenditure, which is 
constrained to be non-negative. Thus, we use maximum likelihood Tobit estimation 
(Tobin, 1958).  
Slightly less than 30% of the consumer loyalty responses were missing. In order 
to reduce efficiency losses, we replaced missing observations with conditional mean 
imputed values based on dependent and independent variables (see Little, 1992 for a 
discussion of this method). This method generates missing independent variables 
employing a weighted least squares regression on all other variables, and replacing the 
missing values with the predicted values from the regression. The original and the Maratou, Gomez and Just  Market Power and Off-Invoice Trade Promotions in the US   
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generated values are shown in table 2. Because this procedure induces heteroscedastic 
errors, we obtain robust estimates of the Tobit model. 
Most contractual arrangements result from the simultaneous interactions of both 
parties and their corresponding preferences. Here we have modeled TPs as if they are 
designed and offered by a manufacturer, and the retailer has the opportunity to reject the 
TP. Our model assumes that TP allocation is determined primarily by market power of 
the manufacturer and the retailer. We suppose that market dominance is determined prior 
to the negotiation of TPs, and is therefore exogenous. Still, three variables present the 
potential problem of endogeneity. In particular, product category sales, product category 
margins, and product category administration efforts may all three affect one another. 
Controlling for this possible endogeneity is impossible within the constraints of our 
current article. Further, because of the lagged effect of spending on category development, 
it is likely that the endogeneity effect will be small relative to the bias introduced by 
omitting these three variables.  
We estimate the following three Tobit models: (1) a model for the total sample 
without the consumer loyalty variable; (2) a model for the total sample with imputed 
consumer loyalty; and (3) a model for the subset including only the ‘Pure’ retailers with 
consumer loyalty (same variables as in model 2). Our hypotheses are as follows. First the 
market power of retailer increases the percentage of promotional funds allocated to off-
invoice allowances; second, market power of manufacturer decreases the percentage of 
promotional funds allocated to off-invoice allowances; third, formal policies to negotiate 
TPs of retailer increases the percentage of promotional funds allocated to off-invoice Maratou, Gomez and Just  Market Power and Off-Invoice Trade Promotions in the US   
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allowances; fourth, formal policies of manufacturer and cooperation through co-




We present our results in table 4. All components of retailer’s market power are 
significant across all three models and have the expected signs, which indicate that 
greater retailer power results in significant increases the allocation of funds to off-invoice 
TPs. In addition the ability of the retailer to influence the TP decision (retailer selects) is 
significant and has a high size across all models. 
[Table 4 About Here] 
In contrast, it is interesting that few variables describing market power of the 
manufacturer are significant in the TP negotiation. Specifically, only the share of 
manufacturer’s brand in the national market is significant across all models, and it 
confirms the literature of shifting of the balance of power from manufacturers toward 
retailers. Our results suggest that increases in market power of manufacturers have 
modest effects in reducing the amount of funds allocated to off-invoice TPs (in contrast 
to the significant power of the retailer).  
Formal TP policy of manufacturer (which increases allocation to pay-for-
performance TPs) is significant across all models. Likewise co-marketing policy 
variables are significant in model 1 and model 2. The magnitude of these variables is 
higher than the magnitude of the variables measuring market power of retailer. So our Maratou, Gomez and Just  Market Power and Off-Invoice Trade Promotions in the US   
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estimates show that manufacturers can outweigh their slightly weaker position of the 
manufacturer when they have specific TP policies favoring pay-for-performance 
promotions. 
Consumer loyalty of retailer is significant in model 3, but not nearly so when 
hybrid companies are included in the sample. A possible explanation is that the hybrid 
companies have integrated wholesaling and retailing activities and may base their market 
power more on their economies of scale and not on the end consumer. Product categories 
are not significant, apart from pet food, which appears to have a high magnitude, and 
suggests higher market power of pet food manufacturers. The commercial type of retailer 
(when it is a ‘hybrid’) is significant across all models, and it is logic as the cost structure 
and economies of scale are usually more favorable to hybrid companies than to 
companies that ere retailer only.  
Variables concerning whether the brand is leading or second brand are 
insignificant and show that they do not have a strong pattern. Moreover, it is surprising 
that increased ability of retailer to select the type of TP has a significant negative effect 
on the amount of finds allocated to off-invoice TPs. These results might be due to 
endogeneity, or that the behavior of firm is not what we assumed.  
We conduct joint tests of the elements of each hypothesis using the Wald test. 
Here we conduct a one tailed test of hypotheses with inequalities as the null (e.g. < 0). 
The market power of the retailer should increase the percentage of off-invoice TP. This 
is a joint test that the following variables have a positive sign: retailer sales, share of Maratou, Gomez and Just  Market Power and Off-Invoice Trade Promotions in the US   
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private label of retailer and consumer loyalty (for models 2 and 3). For all three models 
we reject the null hypothesis at the 1% level of confidence, so the hypothesis holds.  
Secondly, the market power of the manufacturer should decrease percent funds 
allocated to off-invoice TPs. We use a joint test that the following variables have a 
negative sign: share of manufacturer’s brand in national market and manufacturer sales 
growth. Here we fail to reject the hypothesis of a positive relationship. While all variables 
have the expected sign, the standard errors are somewhat large. Insignificance may be 
primarily a result of a small data set or problems with quality of the data. Still this results 
provide compelling evidence of the so-called shifting of the balance of power from food 
manufacturers toward supermarket companies. Alternatively there may be other factors 
that better explain the behavior of the manufacturer.  
Third, formal policies for negotiation of TPs of the retailer should increase the 
percentage of off-invoice TPs, whereas the policies of the manufacturer and the 
cooperation through co-marketing should decrease the percentage of off-invoice TPs. We 
jointly test that the following variables have the correct signs: retailer policy dummy, 
manufacturer policy dummy and co-marketing dummy, and we reject the null hypothesis 
across all models, at the 1% level of confidence.  
 
Conclusion 
Our results provide industry executives and public policy makers a better understanding 
on key market power factors driving trade promotion negotiations, and how these factors 
differ by product category and company. Such understanding is essential for private firm Maratou, Gomez and Just  Market Power and Off-Invoice Trade Promotions in the US   
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profitability, improved food distribution system coordination and performance. The 
methodology that we employ illustrates the importance of retailer and manufacturer’s 
market power as well as their relative position in the supply chain in the formulation and 
structure of TPs. Our results suggest that market power of retailers positively affects the 
amount of funds that manufacturers allocate to off-invoice TPs. In contrast, our findings 
show that market power of manufacturers has a weaker influence on expenditures. This 
result confirms the apparent trend of power shifting across the supply chain to retailers.  
Yet, our estimates indicate that when manufacturers have formal policies of the 
negotiation of trade promotions, they are able to improve their slightly weaker position 
relative to retailers. In future research, more effort should be made to understand the 
behavior of the firms and the impact on TP when the retailer selects the final outcome, as 
our results find no particular pattern of influence in this regard. Finally, there is a need for 
further research to improve the quality of the data allowing more robust estimation 
procedures commonly used in estimating joint bargaining relationships. By illuminating 
the process by which TP are negotiated and the factors affecting power sharing, greater 




1 Price difference of the brand are calculated as [(price of brand - average product 
category price)/average product category price]*100 Maratou, Gomez and Just  Market Power and Off-Invoice Trade Promotions in the US   
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Figure 1. Scheme of the theoretical model 
 
(1)   TP_offinvoice      Market_Power_R        Market_Power_M      Relative_Power(R/M)   
•   % Off-Invoice 
from total TP 
expenditure 
•   Outlet 
distinctiveness_
R 
•   Brand 
distinctiveness_M 
•   Brand’s Relative 
Importance 
  •   Competitive 
position_R 
•   Competitive position_M  •   Ability to influence 
  •   Category 
importance_R 
•   Category importance_M  •   Policies 
  •   Consumer 
loyalty_R 
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Table 1. Variables Descriptions 
Variables Explanation 
% Off-invoice TP   Share allocation of Off-invoice Trade Promotion from Total TP expenses 
Product Category Dummies   
Coffee   1 if product category is coffee; zero otherwise 
RTE   1 if product category is ready-to-eat cereal; zero otherwise 
Pet   1 if product category is pet food; zero otherwise 
Laundry   1 if product category is Laundry; zero otherwise 
Frozen dinner   1 if product category is frozen dinners & entrees; zero otherwise 
Market Power of Retailer   
Outlet distinctiveness   
‘Hybrid’ Retailer Type
*    Type of retailer (1-grocery, 2- warehouse, 3-hybrid) 
Consumer Loyalty  
Scores are on as scale of 0 to 100% and indicate general satisfaction 
with the shopping experience. 
Competitive position   
Retailer Sales
*  Retailer annual sales, 2002 
Share of Private Label
*  Private labels % of retailer 
Market Power of Manufacturer   
Brand distinctiveness   
Share of Manuf. Brand in 
National Market
* 
Manufacturer’s brand share in the pc’s national market 
Competitive position   
Manufacturer Sales growth
*  Manufacturer average sales growth in the last 3 years 
Relative Power (R/M)   
Brand’s Relative Importance:   
Leading Brand  1 if leading brand; zero otherwise 
Second Brand   1 if second brand; zero otherwise 
Ability to influence   
Retailer Initiates TP procedure   Percent of times retailer initiates TP procedure 
Retailer Selects TP type  Percent of times retailer selects TP type 
Policies   
Retailer Policy dummy  1 exists TP policy of retailer for increasing off-invoice; zero otherwise
Manufacturer Policy dummy 
1 exists TP policy of retailer for increasing pay-for-performance; zero 
otherwise 
Co-marketing dummy  1 exists co-marketing policy of R & M; zero otherwise 
 
                                                      
* Note: these variables came from secondary sources (published data for publicly traded 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for sample with both types of Retailer (‘Pure’ and 
‘Hybrid’)
a 
Variables Obs.  Mean  Std.  Deviation  Min  Max 
Dependent Variable          
% Off-invoice TP from Total TP expenses  185  0.257  0.323  0  1 
Explanatory variables          
Product Category Dummies          
Coffee   186  0.161  0.368  0  1 
RTE   186  0.258  0.438  0  1 
Pet   186  0.129  0.336  0  1 
Laundry   186  0.145  0.353  0  1 
Frozen dinner  186  0.242    0.429  0  1 
Market Power of Retailer          
Outlet distinctiveness          
Type of Retailer categorical variable  186  1.484  0.858  1  3 
Consumer Loyalty R          
Consumer Loyalty  144  73.666  3.162  68  82 
Consumer Loyalty Generated 186  73.773  2.843  68  82 
Competitive position           
Retailer Sales  186  9.508  10.679  1  51.8 
Share of Private Label of Retailer  183  0.066  0.061  0  0.3 
Market Power of Manufacturer          
Brand distinctiveness          
Share of Manuf. Brand in National Market 185  17.974  13.169  1  46.3 
Competitive position          
Manufacturer Sales growth  185  4.706  9.566  -22.9  55.6 
Relative Power (R/M)          
Brand’s Relative Importance:          
Leading Brand  186  0.333  0.473  0  1 
Second Brand   186  0.333  0.473  0  1 
Ability to influence          
Retailer Initiates TP procedure   185  0.498  0.238  0  1 
Retailer Selects TP type  183  0.589  0.269  0  1 
Policies          
Retailer Policy dummy  186  0.123  0.330  0  1 
Manufacturer Policy dummy  186  0.107  0.310  0  1 
Co-marketing dummy  186  0.0860  0.281  0  1 
                                                      
a Correlations: policy of manufacturer & co-marketing: correlation of 0.47 and leading & 
second brand: correlation of –0.50 Maratou, Gomez and Just  Market Power and Off-Invoice Trade Promotions in the US   
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Variables Obs.  Mean  Std.  Deviation  Min  Max 
Dependent Variable          
% Off-invoice TP from Total TP expenses  140  0.288  0.332  0  1 
Explanatory variables          
Product Category Dummies          
Coffee   141  0.170  0.377  0  1 
RTE   141  0.276  0.448  0  1 
Pet   141  0.127  0.335  0  1 
Laundry   141  0.127  0.335  0  1 
Frozen dinner   141  0.276  0.449     
Market Power of Retailer          
Outlet distinctiveness          
Only ‘Pure’ Retailers included  Na  Na  Na  Na  Na  
Consumer Loyalty           
Consumer Loyalty Generated 141  73.586  3.195  68  82 
Competitive position          
Retailer Sales  141  9.296  11.775  1  51.8 
Share of Private Label of Retailer  138  0.0713  0.066  0  0.3 
Market Power of Manufacturer          
Brand distinctiveness          
Share of Manuf. Brand in National Market 140  17.320  12.460  1.5  46.3 
Competitive position           
Manufacturer Sales growth  185  4.706  9.566  -22.9  55.6 
Relative Power (R/M)          
Brand’s Relative Importance:          
Leading Brand  141  0.333  0.473  0  1 
Second Brand   141  0.333  0.473  0  1 
Ability to influence          
Retailer Initiates TP procedure   140  0.497  0.252  0  1 
Retailer Selects TP type  139  0.599  0.288  0  1 
Policies          
Retailer Policy dummy  141  0.142  0.350  0  1 
Manufacturer Policy dummy  141  0.113  0.318  0  1 
Co-marketing dummy  141  0.092  0.290  0  1 
 
                                                      
b Correlations: policy of manufacturer & co-marketing: correlation of 0.53 and leading & 
second: correlation of –0.50 Maratou, Gomez and Just  Market Power and Off-Invoice Trade Promotions in the US   
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Table 4. Tobit estimates
c 
 
Explanatory variables:  (1)  (2)   (3)   Expected 
sign 
Product Category Dummies       
Coffee   -0.134 (0.149)  -0.156  (0.150)  -0.267 (0.229)  +/- 
RTE   -0.102 (0.135)  -0.088 (0.135)  -0.123 (0.215)  +/- 
Pet   -0.299
* (0.169)  -0.279
* (0.169)  -0.298 (0.239)  +/- 
Laundry   -0.066 (0.152)  -0.048 (0.152)  -0.099 (0.228)  +/- 
Frozen dinner   0.094 (0.168)  0.102 (0.168)  -0.038 (0.229)  +/- 
Market Power of Retailer       
Outlet distinctiveness        
‘Hybrid’ Retailer Type    -0.145
** (0.073)  -0.151
** (0.073)  Na  +/- 
Consumer Loyalty         
Consumer Loyalty Generated  Not used  0.014 (0.0114)  0.018 (0.0029)
***  +  
Competitive position        
Retailer Sales  0.009
*** (0.0028)  0.010
*** (0.0028)  0.013
*** (0.637)  + 
Share of Private Label of Retailer  2.615
*** (0.602)  2.635
*** (0.600)  2.889
*** (0.637)  + 
Market Power of Manufacturer       
Brand distinctiveness        
Share of Manuf. Brand in National Market -0.003 (0.0037)  -0.003 (0.004)  -0.007
* (0.004)  - 
Competitive position        
Manufacturer Sales growth  -0.003 (0.003)  -0.003 (0.003)  -0.0024 (0.004)  - 
Relative Power (R/M)       
Brand’s Relative Importance:        
Leading Brand  0.033 (0.092)  0.034  (0.092)  0.103  (0.100)  +/- 
Second Brand   -0.0087 (0.082)  -0.008  (0.082)  0.037  (0.091)  +/- 
Ability to influence        
Retailer Initiates TP procedure   0.107 (0.155)  0.088 (0.155)  -0.043 (0.159)  +/- 
Retailer Selects TP type  -0.242
* (0.127)   -0.232
* (0.127)   -0.239
* (0.130)   + 
Policies        
Retailer Policy dummy  0.087 (0.107)  0.058 (0.109)  0.0781 (0.107)  +  
Manufacturer Policy dummy  -0.336
*** (0.119)  -0.334
*** (0.119)  -0.363
*** (0.130)  -  
Co-marketing dummy  -0.271
* (0.139)  -0.236
* (0.142)   -0.156 (0.149)  - 
Constant  0.198 (0.170)   -0.828 (0.872)  -1.041 (0.236)   
Number of obs   180  180  136   
Pseudo R2   0.2539  0.2597  0.3228   
Left censored  63  63  43   
LR chi2  LR chi2(17) = 
62.59 
LR chi2(18) = 
64.02 
LR chi2(17) = 
61.09 
 
Log likelihood  -91.96214  -91.242877  -65.35671   
                                                      
c Standard errors in parentheses; 
*** p-value<0.01; 
** p-value<0.05; 
* p-value<0.10; Maratou, Gomez and Just  Market Power and Off-Invoice Trade Promotions in the US   
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